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Labor Markets and Adjustment in Open Asian
Economies: The Republic of Korea and Malaysia
Dipak Mazumdar
This article deals with the adjustment following external shocks in two open Asian
economies: the Republic of Korea and Malaysia. There were important differences in
the economic structure of the two countries as well as significant differences in the way
external events produced "crises" that interrupted their dynamic economic growth.
Detailed analyses of economic cycles in the two decades preceding 1987-88 show that
the behavior of factor markets, particularly the markets for labor and foreign exchange,
helped Korea to adjust quickly to the shocks but in Malaysia actually caused the crisis
to deepen.
For economies heavily dependent on exports, the unit cost of labor in dollars is of
central importance as an index of the competitiveness of exports and hence of their
ability to mount a sustained recovery after a difficult period. Accordingly, the heart of
the analysis is the determination of the unit cost of labor and the factors affecting its
change throughout the cycles. Concentration on this critical variable helps to spotlight
the crucial differences in the factor markets of the two economies.
Many developing countries experienced serious problems of adjustment follow-
ing "shocks" originating in the international economy in the 1970s and the
1980s. The problems were naturally more severe the more open was the econ-
omy concerned. The shocks transmitted by the world economy included large
fluctuations in the prices of primary commodities and of oil; sharp increases in
interest rates in the early 1980s; and disruption in financial markets, which
made access to foreign borrowing difficult for many countries. Countries dif-
fered greatly in how well they adjusted. The most important variables were,
first, the fiscal-monetary policies that enabled the countries to try to reestablish
balance in their aggregate income-expenditure accounts for internal and external
stability and, second, the flexibility in the factor market, which helped to pre-
serve, and perhaps augment, international competitiveness in a volatile world
market. This article analyzes the factors affecting the latter by comparing the
experiences of two open Asian economies: the Republic of Korea and Malaysia.
Dipak Mazumdar is with the Africa Regional Office at the World Bank.
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-I,n.the two decades ending in the mid-1980s both Korea and Malaysia had
high rates of growth based on a sharp expansion of exports. Both had their
growth interrupted twice by events associated with the two oil price hikes,
although the interruptions occurred through different mechanisms, and both
bounded back very quickly after a short-lived depression. There were important
differences, however, in the structure of the two economies. Korea's export
economy was based much more on manufactured goods, and, whereas Korea
was an oil importer, export of mineral fuel was an important (but not a domi-
nant) element of Malaysia's trade account. Apart from such structural differ-
ences there were important institutional differences in factors affecting the unit
cost of labor, and it is these that the analysis here seeks to highlight.
For economies so heavily dependent on exports, the unit labor cost in dollars
needs to decline in times of economic depression to restore the country's compet-
itiveness in the world market, and it needs to stabilize to sustain its growth when
the world economy revives. The unit cost of labor is defined precisely in section
11. Its determinants and course in the two economies are the central topic of this
article. Events in the labor market, which determine the ratio of wages to labor
productivity, as well as in the foreign exchange market, which determine the
nominal exchange rate, are equally important in defining the course of the unit
cost of labor, together with the ratio of producer to consumer prices. But there
are differences in the institutional structures and policies affecting behavior in
the labor and foreign exchange markets in the two economies. Microeconomic
events in their markets, in particular, affect the course of macroeconomic adjust-
ments in economies responding to external shocks.
This discussion analyzes the course of the unit cost of labor in only the manu-
facturing sectors of the two economies. Korea was already established as a newly
industrialized country in the period under consideration. Its competitiveness in
the world market of manufactured export goods was critical to its continued
growth. Malaysia's exports were, by contrast, still dominated by primary com-
modities and fuels, with manufactured goods accounting for 20 percent of total
exports in 1980. But manufactured goods were rapidly increasing their share of
exports. More important, primary commodities and fuel were subject to major
fluctuations in prices. When world prices for primary commodities and fuel
plunged more or less simultaneously in 1981-82, Malaysia had to look to its
exports of manufactures and their continued growth to provide stability to its
external accounts. Thus, maintaining international competitiveness in manufac-
turing was of critical importance to Malaysia's adjustment in the 1980s.
Section I briefly sketches economic events, with particular reference to eco-
nomic cycles in the two countries in the two decades before 1986-87. Section II
derives the components of the unit cost of labor. The changes in these compo-
nents during the cycles in the two economies are analyzed empirically in section
III. Section IV, the heart of the analysis, contrasts the critical elements in the
labor and foreign exchange markets in Korea and Malaysia with reference to the
determinants of international competitiveness. Section V concludes.
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I. GROWTH AND CYCLES IN KOREA AND MALAYSIA
The major phases of the economic history of the two countries are shown in
figure 1.
Korea
In the decade before the first oil crisis, Korea had an uninterrupted period of
growth in gross domestic product (GDP), which averaged 9.7 percent a year in
real terms. During this period Korea's role as an exporter of manufactures was
firmly established. The share of manufactured goods in total exports increased
from 17.6 percent in 1962 to 76.1 percent in 1970 (Dornbusch and Park 1987:
394). The barter terms of trade were more or less stable, but the strong export
growth is revealed in the growth of the income terms of trade at an annual rate
of about 40 percent a year (Mazumdar 1990: figure 2). The growth stopped
following the oil price hike of 1973. As an oil importer Korea suffered directly,
and the slowdown in the world economy dampened the export sector. The rate
of growth of the income terms of trade fell from its high level to 10 percent in
1975. Although it bounced back to a positive value the next year, it was at a
much lower level than the average in the period of growth. The real GDP growth
rate in 1974 and 1975 was around 6 percent a year, 50 percent below the
average attained in the previous five or six years.
Korea's response to the crisis was to embark on a "big push" in its investment
program in the heavy and chemical industries. The policymakers elected to
borrow through the crisis and let the foreign debt ratio increase to maintain the
planned investment rate. For the first time, the exchange rate was fixed in spite
of rising inflationary pressure. This phase of Korean economic policy has been
the subject of controversy. Although the budget deficit widened and the associ-
ated increase in the real exchange rate eroded external competitiveness in the
short run, some analysts have maintained that laying the foundations for heavy
industry helped to diversify industry and exports in the long run. Real growth
during the period of the big push was moderate by Korean standards.
Although Korea benefited from the export of skilled labor to the Middle East,
the crisis generated by the events during the big push led to a major depression at
the end of the decade following the second oil price hike. Both the barter and the
income terms of trade turned negative. The GDP growth rate fell and for the first
time was negative in 1980. As domestic savings plunged, the current account
deficit mushroomed, leading to the largest accumulation of foreign debt in
Korea's history.
The depression was short lived. Economic policies adopted during the period
prepared Korea for a strong positive response when world trade rebounded in
1983-84 and helped the economy to override another dip in the world growth
rate in 1985. Section II will focus on the nexus of policies that enabled Korea to
reduce the unit cost of labor (in dollars) during the crisis and prepared the way
for the recovery.
Figure 1. Economic Cycles in the Republic of Korea and Malaysia, 1970-88
Republic of Korea
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But other, more important, factors made the Korean economy vulnerable to
external shocks and made its success in controlling the impact all the more
remarkable.
First, there was high dependence on exports at the same time that Korea was
dependent on crucial imports, including oil.
Second, and less well known, was Korea's persistent balance of payments
deficit in the current account, a deficit that continued until the mid-1980s and
increased during the oil price shocks. The deficit was used to bridge the gap
between domestic savings and investment and thus to maintain a rate of invest-
ment higher than would have been possible from strictly domestic savings. In the
crisis years the normal deficit expanded greatly as Korea tried to spend its way
out of the recession. But a critical part of the economic management was the
strict control over foreign borrowing. Both short- and long-term borrowing
required government approval (see Dornbusch and Park 1987: 417-19 and the
references cited therein).
Third, the continued deficits led to a high ratio of debt to gross national
product (GNP), a ratio that increased from around 25 percent at the beginning of
the 1970s to more than 50 percent in the early 1980s. In fact, the debt ratio was
as high as in some Latin American countries during the acute debt crisis. How-
ever, because of the success in export growth, the debt-export ratio was way
below Latin American levels and facilitated its servicing (Sachs 1985).
Finally, because investment was always outrunning domestic savings, Korea
walked the tightrope of inflation for most of the period under consideration.
The inflation rate exploded to 30 percent or more during the periods of shock.
But the inflation rate never reached the level of Latin America.
In sum, the Korean pattern of growth made it very sensitive to instabilities,
particularly those originating in the international economy. Careful and strict
management of key policies affecting the unit cost of labor were required.
Malaysia
Malaysia is one of the most open economies of Asia. Exports as a proportion
of GDP hovered around 50 percent in the 1970s and increased through the
1980s, reaching 72 percent in 1988. Unlike Korea, Malaysia is an oil exporter.
But although it benefited from the oil price hikes in 1973 and 1979, it showed
severe problems of adjustment when oil prices declined in the 1980s. Also unlike
Korea, commodities accounted for a major portion of the exports of Malaysia
during the period of this study. The share of manufactured goods in total ex-
ports continued to increase, from 26 percent in 1970 to 42 percent in 1987. But
fluctuations in commodity prices have dominated the movement of Malaysia's
external accounts and the terms of trade and, through it, the cycles in GDP
growth. The instability of the economy has been accentuated by the fact that the
international prices of Malaysia's main commodity exports have tended to move
together. Moreover, some of the emerging lines of manufactured exports, such
as electronics, have a highly volatile market.
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The cycles in the Malaysian economy in the 1970s and the 1980s consist of
two phases. Starting in 1972 the terms of trade had a sustained upswing until
1979, when it was 50 percent higher than when it started. This upswing was
interrupted in 1975, but only briefly, because the sharp fall in the terms of trade
that year was completely wiped out by a recovery in the following year. The
terms of trade began to decline in 1980, and by 1986 it had fallen by as much as
it had risen in the 1970s-50 percent, with a short but unsustained increase in
1984. As is usual in commodity trade, quantity fluctuations accentuated the
cycles in the terms of trade. In current values, exports of "inedible crude mate-
rials" in 1979 were 3.5 times higher than in 1972, but in 1985-86 they were
actually 25 percent below the 1979 level. With the inclusion of mineral fuels,
oils, and fats, the value of commodity exports in 1979 was 5.5 times the level of
1972, but in 1986 it was only 20 percent higher than in 1979 (World Bank 1989;
Gan and Krause 1989).
The GDP growth rate fluctuated along with the fluctuations in the terms of
trade but was also significantly affected by government spending and by the
private sector's savings-investment balance. By and large, public and private
sector savings behavior has been anticyclical in Malaysia. Insofar as this type of
economy depends a great deal for its revenue on taxes on the external sector, the
resources for public spending were augmented in the upswing. But the upswing
did not trigger public sector overspending. In this phase of the cycle the budget
deficit was fairly constant as a percentage of GDP, although it increased in
absolute terms. In the private sector, however, savings rose to record heights,
exceeding investment by a large margin. Thus real income in the economy
increased much more rapidly than expenditure, leading to a current account
surplus in the balance of payments that was sustained throughout the upswing.
Malaysia entered a new phase of the cycle at the beginning of the 1980s, when
it faced the sharp decline in commodity prices. The average impact of external
price developments during 1981-83 was to reduce national income by 4.5 per-
cent (World Bank 1989: 3). The Fourth Malaysia Five-Year Plan for 1981-85
reflected the changed situation. Targets for production were appropriately set
below the levels achieved in the 1970s. The growth rate of GDP was projected at
7.6 percent a year in real terms. But the two key elements of this forecast were
continued rapid growth of manufactured exports (especially textiles and elec-
tronics) and sustained growth in domestic demand (5.9 percent), led by non-oil
private investment (11 percent). In other words, the clear expectation was a shift
in the sources of growth from the export of commodities to manufacturing
based on both the domestic and world markets. The plan envisaged that the
projected growth would be almost entirely financed from domestic sources;
foreign financing was not expected to exceed 0.2 percent of total investment.
But actual developments turned out to be very different, as indicated by the data
in table 1.
Private sector investment did not pick up in the way expected. The govern-
ment policy response was to compensate for the shortfall by launching an accel-
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Table 1. Key Macroeconomic Developments in Malaysia, 1981-87
Fourth Malaysia Five-Year Plan
Target, Actual values
Indicator 1981-8S 1981-84 1985 1986 1987
Terms of trade 99.5 80.4 79.2 76.0 79.3
(1980 = 100)a
Current account surplus -0.1 -10.2 -2.4 -0.3 8.3
(percentage of GNP)
Overall public sector deficit -6.7 -17.6 -5.7 -10.6 -8.4
(percentage of GNP)
Real growth (percent)
GDP 7.6 6.7 -1.0 1.2 5.2
Agriculture 3.0 2.9 2.5 4.0 7.5
Manufacturing 11.0 8.6 -3.8 7.5 12.7
Construction 9.0 8.1 -8.4 -14.0 -6.0
Government services 9.0 6.5 2.1 4.3 4.0
Note: The Fourth Malaysia Five-Year Plan was for 1981-85.
a. 1970 weights.
Source: World Bank (1989: table 2.1, p. 4 ).
erated program of public expenditure to sustain real growth in the economy. It is
true that there were accumulated reserves earned during the preceding boom in
commodity prices. Also, the forecasts for oil prices continued to be optimistic
from the Malaysian standpoint. But the high pace of public investment and
growth in expenditure could be sustained only by a budget deficit, which turned
out to be nearly three times higher as a percentage of GNP than was envisaged in
the Fourth Plan.
There are only three ways of financing a budget deficit: inflationary finance
through an accommodating monetary policy, a reduction in private domestic
absorption through a rise in domestic savings or a fall in investment, and an
increase in foreign borrowing. In Malaysia the first option was foreclosed by the
monetary authorities. A policy of monetary restraint was adopted explicitly to
prevent the budget deficit from spilling over into inflationary pressures and
current account deficits in the balance of payments. From 1980 onward the
annual rate of growth of the money supply (Ml) declined continuously, register-
ing a growth rate of -0.6 percent in 1984.1 As a consequence, the rate of
inflation, averaging 4.2 percent as measured by the GDP deflator, was lower in
this period than in the previous phase of the upswing, when it averaged 8.9
percent. This was the case even though the rate of inflation increased in succes-
sive years after 1981.
As far as private domestic absorption was concerned, unlike in the preceding
boom, private savings fell sharply in the downswing of the cycle. Of course, this
1. This policy was in sharp contrast to the general practice of Latin American monetary authorities,
who seem to passively follow the needs of the fiscal authorities for monetary accommodation. The
difference between Malaysia (and other East Asian countries), on the one hand, and Latin American
countries, on the other, as to institutions involved in economic decisionmaking is an interesting topic for
investigation.
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was as expected if consumers behaved rationally in attempting to smooth out
fluctuations over time. Savings out of transitory income gains increased during
an upswing of the terms of trade and decreased when the downswing brought
unanticipated loss in income. Private investment did not fall until the recession
years of 1985-86, although its composition might have changed. Thus the
savings-investment balance in the private sector moved in a way opposite to
what was required to offset the government budget deficit.
There was thus only one way left to finance the deficit: borrowing from
external sources. As a result of external debt financing, the debt-GNP ratio
increased dramatically, from 9.4 percent in 1980 to 39.0 percent in 1984.
Furthermore, a great deal of the borrowing was done through commercial banks
at variable interest rates. Loans of this type increased from 45 percent of total
debt in 1980, to 70 percent in 1984, and to a high of nearly 80 percent in 1985.
Because of the high international interest rates of the early 1980s, the average
interest cost of external debt increased from 8.1 percent in 1979 to a high of
13.1 percent in 1981 before falling gradually to 9.7 percent in 1984.
Throughout this period the authorities in Malaysia took a passive attitude
toward the exchange rate. The capital inflow triggered by the budget deficit was
instrumental in causing a significant appreciation of the real exchange rate. As is
shown in more detail in section III, this appreciation, together with adverse
movements in the labor market, reduced Malaysia's competitiveness in the
world market and threatened to create an unsustainable deficit in the current
account of the balance of payments. Although the external sector still depended
heavily on the export of commodities, manufactured goods were, as already
mentioned, emerging as the most dynamic sector. The rising dollar cost of labor
in manufacturing was of particular concern.
The management of economic policy in Malaysia became sensitive to the
emerging economic problem soon after the explosive budget deficit of 1981-82.
Measures to cut government expenditure were initiated in 1983. The ratio of
consolidated public deficit to GDP was drastically reduced, from 18 percent in
1982 to 7 percent in 1985. The improvement of the terms of trade in 1984
proved to be temporary, however, and Malaysia was hit by a further drop in this
key variable in 1985-86. Without an offsetting rise in public expenditures this
time, Malaysia sustained a severe recession, with the rate of growth of GDP
actually turning negative for the first time in 1985 and barely positive in 1986.
The recession, short as it was, managed to correct the basic imbalances in the
economy fairly quickly. Somewhat to the surprise of observers, the Malaysian
economy registered a turnaround, showing a substantial, 5.2 percent rate of
growth of GDP in 1987. The performance in 1988 was even better at 7.9 per-
cent, signifying that the recovery was well under way. The upturn was again
fueled by the external sector, with the terms of trade improving by 18 percent
and the prices of the major non-oil commodities once more increasing in unison.
The total value of commodities exports returned very nearly to the prerecession
level of 1984. But a major development in the behavior of exports during the
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recovery was the leading role taken by manufactured goods, whose share in total
exports climbed to 48 percent by the end of 1988. The next section describes
how factor market flexibility was restored and how the threat of a loss in
competitiveness, a threat that dampened the growth of manufactured exports in
1985-86, proved to be short lived, at least on this occasion.
During this period of recovery, the growth of public expenditure was re-
strained. With the public sector deficit holding steady in proportion to GNP and
the gap between private savings and investment still remaining positive, there
was no need for the economy to borrow from abroad. In fact, the accumulation
of reserves through the surplus in the current account during these years enabled
the government to prepay a substantial amount of the outstanding external debt.
The ratio of gross debt to GDP fell from a high of 52 percent in 1985 to 37
percent in 1987 and was as low as 30 percent in 1988.
II. DETERMINANTS OF THE UNIT COST OF LABOR IN DOLLARS
This section sets out the framework within which determinants of the unit
cost of labor in dollars can be studied. The aim is to pinpoint the key factors that
affected the international competitiveness of the two economies during the pe-
riods of crisis and adjustment discussed in section I.
The Components of the Unit Cost of Labor
Define the unit cost of labor in dollars, U,, as
(1) U, = WI V 1l/e
where W denotes wages per worker, V denotes value added per worker, and e
denotes the exchange rate (wons per dollar).
The following relation can be derived from equation 1:
cj= W-V-e
(2) + P)-(v + Pp)-e
= (w- v) + (P - Pp) -e
where the dots represent proportionate rates of change. The additional variables
are defined as follows: w is the real wage (in terms of consumer goods), v is an
index of the physical productivity of labor, P, is an index of the cost of living,
and Pp is an index of prices of manufactured goods. Equation 2 decomposes the
percentage change in the unit cost of labor into three elements: the wage-
productivity gap, the shift in the ratio of consumer to producer prices, and the
change in the nominal exchange rate.
The first term depends on the behavior of the labor market. The second is
what is sometimes called the domestic real exchange rate (DRER), on the assump-
tion that P, is the price of nontraded goods and P. is the price of traded goods.
This is by and large true in the economies being examined. A large proportion of
the manufactured goods produced in these economies is exported, so the price
index for manufactured goods would indeed be the price index for traded goods.
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Nontraded services, transport, and housing costs (as determined by the cost of
land and buildings) have a dominant place in the consumer budget. The only
major item of consumption that is generally a traded good is rice-an important
staple in the Asian diet. But Malaysia and Korea, like many other Asian econ-
omies, maintain an administered price of rice. The domestic price is insulated
from the world trading price by a public marketing agency that is funded to
accumulate and sell from its own buffer stock. Thus P, would be a good proxy
for a price index of nontraded goods.
The Relation between the Domestic Real Exchange Rate
and the Nominal Exchange Rate
Movements in the second term in the last line of equation 2, the DRER, are likely
to be related to changes in the nominal exchange rate, e. Thus, when there is a
devaluation of the currency, both Pc and Pp rise in the local currency. But the price
of traded goods is anchored in the world market setting, placing a limit on the
extent to which P. can rise in the domestic market. P,, however, depends much
more on domestic fiscal and monetary policies and generally has a tendency to
exceed increases in Pp in an inflationary situation fueled by the devaluation. 2 This
is so even when the domestic price of rice is administratively set by the buffer stock
scheme. In Korea, for instance, the objective of the food policy is a dual one:
supporting a high price for the farmer and enabling consumers to buy at a lower
price (although one that is still higher than the world price). The difference be-
tween the buying and selling prices creates a deficit for the so-called Grain Man-
agement Fund, which is used to administer the policy. Apart from the domestic
procurement, the government has had to import a substantial amount of rice and
barley to hold down selling prices. Thus with devaluation, the deficit of the fund
increases. Although food prices are not directly affected, the inflationary impact
of the devaluation through an increase in the fiscal deficit could be significant.
A second channel through which movements in e and the DRER are related is
through the familiar story of the "Dutch disease" class of models: within tradable
goods, commodities are distinguished from manufactured goods. The improve-
ment of the terms of trade comes through a boom in the price of commodities, but
the prices of the other traded goods do not experience a (relative) increase. The
improvement in the terms of trade leads to a balance of payments surplus on the
current account and, other things remaining unchanged, causes the exchange rate
to appreciate. At the same time the "spending effect"-whether in the private
sector or public sector, or both-induced by the boom in commodity prices causes
a relative increase in the price of nontradable goods, although, with world prices
of manufactured goods unchanged, Pp in domestic currency actually falls. Thus
the DRER sharply increases together with e. The unit cost of labor increases both
because of e and because of appreciation in the DRER, unless it is offset by a
2. In the traditional theoretical literature the object of devaluation is to increase P, in relation to P, to
help shift resources to the tradable sector. The argument here is that this objective may be thwarted if the
secondary effect through inflation is sufficiently strong.
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sufficient increase in the wage-productivity gap in the labor market.3 This course
of events might be altered by changes in the capital account of the balance of
payments, and, as we shall see, this was indeed the case in Malaysia.
A difference between the Korean and Malaysian exchange rate systems is of
central importance and should be stressed here. The argument above assumed
that the economy followed a freely floating exchange rate system. This was
indeed the case in Malaysia with, in addition, no control on the movement of
capital. Korea, by contrast, had a managed exchange rate system with strict
control on foreign capital flows. This difference is reflected more in the way
exchange rate policies have been implemented than in the declared intentions of
the economic regimes of the two countries. In September 1975, the ringgit
(previously the Malaysian dollar) was pegged to a basket of currencies of its
major trading partners. But the central bank has repeatedly declared its inten-
tions that "the Bank's policy to intervene has been, and will continue to be,
directed at moderating fluctuations, but not at preventing the exchange rate
from reflecting any underlying trend in the balance of market supply and de-
mand" (Malaysia Bank Negara 1979: 311). Similarly Balassa and Williamson
state: "The Koreans often describe their exchange rate policy as one of pegging
to a basket containing the five currencies that constitute the special drawing
right, weighted to reflect the importance to Korea of each of the five currencies.
It is mathematically impossible that this is what they have actually done, how-
ever, unless at least one of the currencies has a negative weight!" (1987: 45-46).
It will be shown below that although Malaysian exchange rate policy has been
largely accommodating to international events, Korea has been aggressive in
paying close attention to the maintenance of its international competitiveness
and has therefore been sensitive to the course of the domestic producers' costs as
affected by external shocks. Apart from differences in labor market behavior, it
will be suggested that this difference in exchange rate systems played a critical
role in the contrasting paths of the unit cost of labor in the periods of crisis and
adjustment.
III. THE COMPONENTS OF CHANGES IN THE UNIT COST OF LABOR
FOR KOREA AND MALAYSIA
This section analyzes the data in the components of the unit cost of labor for
the two countries. The sources of the data are given in the appendix.
3. A point of some importance turns on the distinction between exhaustible and nonexhaustible
resources within the category of "commodities." When the unit cost of labor of traded manufactured
goods increases through the "Dutch disease" mechanism, the longer-run problem is less serious when the
rise in prices affects nonexhaustible resources than when it affects exhaustible resources. In the latter case
the adverse impact on the unit cost of labor is accompanied by a decline in the country's assets. Malaysia
was an exporter of commodities of both the exhaustible type (oil and gas) and the nonexhaustible type
(rubber, palm oil, sawn logs). In 1975 the exhaustible type was only a third of the nonexhaustible type in
export value, but by 1981-82 the former had caught up with the latter.
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Korea
The Korean data for the manufacturing sector are set out in table 2. Averages
for the components of the percentage changes in the unit cost of labor are given
for significant groups of years. The trend as well as the course of the variables
over the short-run cycles in the economy are of interest. First, the data indicate
that there has been a long-term trend in the decline of the nominal exchange
rate. As noted in section I, Korea was walking the tightrope of inflation through-
out the period of its growth, as domestic investment continuously outstripped
domestic savings. The persistent devaluation of the won-except during the big
push in the late 1 970s-was an attempt to prevent Korea's competitiveness from
being eroded. 4 In many countries such attempts to prevent the erosion of exter-
nal competitiveness have been thwarted by the feedback effect of the devaluation
on the other two terms affecting the unit cost of labor. Devaluation is known to
feed the inflationary spiral, causing the DRER to increase and eroding the effect
of the devaluation. Second, the objective of policy might be defeated by a wage-
price spiral, causing the relative change in real wages to increase faster than the
annual percentage increase in labor productivity.
The data in table 2 indicate that, although the DRER increased as expected in
response to the devaluations, the offsetting effect was small. The success of
Korean macroeconomic policy in preventing a chronic inflationary situation
from exploding into destabilizingly high rates of inflation is of relevance here.
Unlike many Latin American countries, the tight rein on the magnitude of the
government budget deficit in Korea has been remarkable. The ratio of the
budget deficit to GNP, although swinging wildly from year to year, never reached
5 percent and was never allowed to stay very high for more than two years at a
stretch (Dornbusch and Park 1987: 413-19).
The impact of the persistent devaluation in reducing the unit cost of labor was
generally reinforced by a lag of the rate of increase of real wages behind that of
labor productivity. The wage-setting institutions in Korea that allowed this
result to be achieved are of great interest and will be discussed below. But
equally important is that the more or less continuous decline in the share of
wages did not imply a fall in real wages. On the contrary, real wage growth
4. The data for Korea presented in the text uses the won-dollar exchange rate. In practice, exchange
rate management in Korea seems to have been more concerned with the won's relation to the dollar than
to the other major currencies of its trading partners (Balassa and Williamson 1987: 46). For example,
during 1975-79, when the won was fixed, it was pegged to the dollar. Balassa and Williamson have
calculated nominal exchange rates for Korea from 1970 to 1986 using trading partner weights and also
competitor weights. When these series are compared with the series for the won-dollar rate, the major
trends and sharp changes are found to be the same. The magnitudes of the depreciation in the different
periods, however, are greater for the alternative series (the Balassa and Williamson series). Thus the
argument of the text is not affected, but the share of exchange rate depreciation in the reduction of the
unit cost of labor cost is somewhat larger if we adopt one or the other of the alternative series for Korea's
exchange rate (Balassa and Williamson 1987: 86-87).
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Table 2. The Unit Cost of Labor and Its Components in the Republic of Korea,
1967-86
(annual percentage change)
Consumer-
Wage- producer Nominal
productivity price average Unit cost of labor
gap differential exchange rate in U.S. dollars
Period (1) (2) (3) (4)=(1)+(2)-(3)
1967-74 -2.16 1.02 6.01 -7.15
1975 -10.45 4.78 19.66 -25.33
1976-78 9.34 0.65 0.00 9.99
1979-81 -12.60 4.90 18.62 -26.32
1981-86 -1.21 0.60 5.28 -5.89
Source: United Nations (various issues); Bank of Korea (various years-b).
averaged more than 5 percent a year throughout the 20-year period and in the
mid-1980s was four times what it was in the mid-1960s. This remarkable result
was possible because of the sustained rate of growth in total factor productivity
(TFP) in Korean development. Although the investment rate in Korea was high,
the growth in labor productivity was to a large extent the result of TFP growth.
Nishimizu and Robinson (1984) showed that, during the 1960s and 1970s,
Korea's TFP grew 3.7 percent a year, by far the highest of the countries covered
in their study.5
Looking more specifically at the individual cycles in the Korean economy,
during the first period of export expansion, 1967-74, the unit cost of labor
declined at a substantial annual rate of 7.15 percent a year. The depreciation of
the nominal exchange rate as well as the excess of productivity growth over
wage growth contributed to the decline in spite of an adverse movement of the
DRER. But in quantitative terms the role of exchange rate depreciation was more
important.
The crisis after the first oil shock and the recession in the world economy,
which led to a fall in Korea's income terms of trade and a slowdown in economic
growth, necessitated that a boost be given to Korea's competitiveness. The
figures for 1975 given in table 2 show how Korean economic policy was able to
cut the unit cost of labor by a massive 25 percent. The data also show how the
cut was achieved: a sharp devaluation, offset by a relatively moderate movement
of the DRER, accounted for three-fifths of the decline, the other two-fifths com-
ing from a sizable increase in the wage-productivity gap. But even this amount of
decline of the real share of labor did not imply a fall in the real wage. Rather,
wage increase in 1975 was held down to 1.4 percent compared with the annual
average increase in excess of 10 percent in 1966-73. This result was possible
because of the high trend increase of TFP growth in the Korean economy.
Much the same story can be told for the years following the second oil price
hike in 1979-81. The magnitude of the decline in the unit cost of labor was
5. Annual TFP growth was 1.3 percent in Turkey, 0.5 percent in Yugoslavia, and 2 percent in Japan.
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large, continuing for two years. Nominal devaluation, offset only partially by an
increase in the DRER, accounted for a somewhat larger share of the decline than
the sizable wage-productivity gap. Again the rather large fall in the real share of
labor did not lead to a massive decrease in real wages. Real wages did decline in
Korean manufacturing during these two years-the only two years that this
happened in the 20-year period. But the decline was moderate: 4.6 percent in
1980 and 0.9 percent in 1981. The increase in Korea's competitiveness contin-
ued in the difficult years of 1981-86, through a combination of real devaluation
and a lag in real wage increases behind the growth of real labor productivity.
Real wage growth after 1982 resumed at a somewhat lower rate of 7 percent a
year until the change in the system of labor relations toward the end of the
decade led to a wage explosion. The story after 1987 is outside the scope of this
article, although some reference is made to it in the discussion of Korean labor
markets below. But it is clear that the increase in competitiveness achieved by
the mid-1980s had left Korea in good shape to take advantage of the recovery in
world trade in the second half of the 1980s.
Malaysia
The relevant statistics for Malaysia are given in table 3 for each year of the
following periods: the commodity boom of the 1970s; the downswing in export
prices, which went hand in hand with the fall in oil prices in the first half of the
1980s; the sharp recession in 1984-85; and the subsequent sharp recovery. The
major point of interest is the behavior of the unit cost of labor, which is exactly
the opposite of what would be predictecf by a standard "Dutch disease" type of
Table 3. The Unit Cost of Labor and Its Components in the Manufacturing
Sector in Malaysia, 1976-87
(annual percentage change)
Consumer-
Wage- producer
productivity price Nominal ex- Unit cost of labor
gap differential change ratea in foreign currency
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)= (1) + (2)-(3)
1976 17.1 -14.8 0.8 1.5
1977 1.2 -5.2 -2.0 -2.0
1978 16.9 -23.6 1.1 -7.8
1979 -19.9 11.9 -3.8 -4.2
1980 -1.4 -2.5 -0.5 -3.4
1981 3.3 5.8 -5.2 14.3
1982 5.3 8.7 -7.2 21.2
1983 0.9 1.2 -6.3 8.4
1984 -0.7 0.2 -6.5 6.0
1985 0.9 3.8 2.1 2.6
1986 -7.3 6.8 17.5 -18.0
1987 -0.5 -2.5 6.0 -9.0
a. The nominal exchange rate is ringgits per unit of foreign currency.
Source: The wage-productivity gap and consumer-producer price differential are from Soon (1990:
table C, p. 16). The exchange rate data are from Can and Krause (1990: table 11).
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model. During the commodity price boom of the second half of the 1970s, the
international competitiveness of Malaysia's manufacturing increased each year
as the unit cost of labor fell. From one year to the next, the nominal exchange
rate did not change all that much. Instead, contrary to the prediction of the
"Dutch disease" model, the DRER actually declined in most years, offsetting any
tendency of real wages to outstrip the increase in productivity. In the subsequent
phase of the downswing of commodity prices, however, the unit cost of labor
increased persistently as all its components moved in a "perverse" way from the
predictions of the standard model. The nominal exchange rate, instead of de-
clining with the fall in the terms of trade, actually increased persistently from
1979 through 1984. Partly as a result of the revaluation, the DRER increased
each year from 1981 to 1985 as the price of tradable manufactures lagged
behind the price of nontradable goods.6 At the same time the growth rate of real
wages was higher than that of labor productivity in manufacturing, contributing
to the increase in the unit cost of labor.
Developments both in the markets for foreign exchange and for labor contrib-
uted to the increase in the U,. The exchange rate fluctuated in the opposite way
from what was expected, because movements in capital flows (as induced by
changes in the aggregate income-expenditure balance in the economy) over-
shadowed the normal effects of movements in the terms of trade. In the labor
market, as can be seen from figure 2, real wage increases started in the 1970s
and continued through the first half of the 1980s, although employment growth
had virtually ceased after 1982 and the rate of recorded unemployment had
increased sharply. These disequilibrating movements in the factor markets in
Malaysia will be contrasted with those in Korea, and the institutional differences
that contributed to the contrast will be discussed.
The sharp increase in the unit cost of labor in the first half of the 1980s
contributed to the events leading to the painful recession of 1985-86. The fall in
the prices of commodities (including oil) was, of course, the immediate cause of
the slide into recession. But the most dynamic sector of the export account was
manufacturing, and a loss in competitiveness in relation to Malaysia's major
competitors threatened to create an unsustainable deficit in the balance of pay-
ments. The government policymakers became acutely aware of the impact of the
budget deficit on the unit cost of labor and its role in undercutting what was
expected to be the most important source of growth. Public deficit spending was
cut drastically and, with little help coming from either commodity price in-
creases or strong growth in manufactured exports, Malaysia went into the sharp
recession of the mid-1980s.
The recession, however, caused the factor markets to collapse. As can be seen
from table 3, the exchange rate declined sharply starting in 1985. Real wages
declined in absolute terms and in relation to labor productivity in 1986 and
6. As in Korea, food is effectively a nontradable good in Malaysia because of the administrative
maintenance of the price of rice in the domestic market.
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Figure 2. Real Wages and Employment in Manufacturing in Malaysia, 1968-88
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Source: Real wages, Richardson and Ying (1990); employment and unemployment, Malaysia (various
years).
1987. In addition, interest rates declined by 50 percent or more. The simul-
taneous decline in costs in all three factor markets triggered a spectacular and
somewhat unexpected recovery starting in 1987.
IV. CONTRASTS BETWEEN KOREAN AND MALAYSIAN FACTOR MARKETS
The contrast in the behavior of the two very open economies of Asia in
response to the international economic shocks is striking. As an oil importer,
Korea needed to reduce its unit cost of labor drastically after each of the two oil
shocks. It did so in a spectacular way. Malaysia, as an oil exporter, was hit by
the decline in oil prices in the 1980s-a decline that unfortunately coincided
with a decline in the prices of its other commodity exports. The Malaysian
response to the crisis seems to have accentuated the problem, partly because of a
carryover of policy responses from the preceding boom. Although the factor
markets showed remarkable downward flexibility in the second half of the
1980s, Malaysia had to undergo a painful recession before the economy recov-
ered. The two key factor markets in the contrasting responses are the labor and
foreign exchange markets. This section looks into the differences between the
two countries in the institutions and behavior of these two markets in turn.
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Labor Markets
We begin the analysis by looking at the process of wage determination and the
factors affecting it in Korea. The contrasting experience of Malaysia is analyzed
subsequently.
Wage determination in Korean manufacturing. The increase in productivity
made it possible for wages to increase. But why did wages actually increase at
the sustained rate that they did? What was the mechanism for determining
wages in industry?
For the period covered in this study, before the late 1980s, the influence of
unions on wage levels was minimal. The right to strike was banned by presiden-
tial decree in 1971. Unions did exist in large firms, particularly in the textile,
metalworking, and chemical sectors. But they needed prior permission from the
government for collective bargaining. Studies of earnings functions have found
no significant effect of unions on relative wages (see, for example, Park 1980:
part 3).
Wage guidelines for both white- and blue-collar workers are specified from
time to time by the Federation of Korean Industries as well as by the Federation
of Korean Trade Unions. The former is dominated by the "chaebol" (the name
given to the group that controls Korea's biggest conglomerates), although the
influence of government on the latter has been recognized for some time. The
government's own influence was used to support wage restraint, as during the
stabilization period of 1980-81, as well as to ensure that the workers received a
share of productivity gains in the years of sustained growth.7
In fact, with or without government encouragement, Korean industry showed
strong predilections toward a profit-sharing system of remuneration. First, the
basic wage constituted no more than 75 percent of total monthly earnings in the
early 1970s and seems to have fallen to 70 percent in the 1980s (Park and
Castaneda 1987: table 17, p. 38), based on various years of the Ministry of
Labor's Occupational Wage Survey. Overtime pay and annual bonuses-both of
which are related to business conditions and profitability-constitute the rest.
Second, the industrial firms, particularly the larger ones, seem to have formed
the internal labor market structure. The level of starting wages in Korea is
predominantly determined by a worker's formal schooling and sex, regardless of
job content (Park 1980: chap. 5). This basic wage rises on an almost regular
basis by certain fixed amounts-the "annual base-up." This "base-up" is directly
7. During 1988-89, the Korean government showed a new commitment to a less interventionist policy
with regard to labor markets. The impact on independent wage bargaining was immediate. After these
successive years of double-digit nominal wage increases, the government suggested that nominal wage
increases should be no higher than real productivity gains. But as shown by continuing labor unrest,
including large-scale strikes, this informal incomes policy is experiencing real difficulty in implementa-
tion. The drastic change in the labor market scene after the government moved toward a hands-off policy
underlines the importance of its effect on wage behavior through the previous periods of Korean
development.
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related to the length of service in the company and is not necessarily associated
with any promotion in job status. Promotion takes the form of skipping several
"base-ups." One econometric study found that "in the case of male workers, one
year of 'inside' experience (with the same employer) tended to raise wages on
average by about 10 percent, whereas one year of outside experience (with a
different employer) raised them by an average of only about 3.8 percent" (Ams-
den 1990: 88, quoting Lee 1983).
With a strong mechanism in place for rewarding firm-specific skills, clearly a
major incentive for efficiency would be the sharing of productivity gains with the
workers. The question might be asked: what is the exact nature of firm-specific
skills being rewarded?
Amsden (1990) makes the point that Korea depended heavily on imported
technology and had little experience in these technologies with the possible
exception of textiles: "Korean managers could never hope to manage in a tight,
'Taylorist' top-down fashion, at least not initially, because no one at the top
knew enough about the process (of production) to do so. Under these condi-
tions, it was imperative to rely upon motivated workers, even if they possessed
little more than formal schooling, to exercise the most fundamental skill of all,
intelligence" (Amsden 1990: 89). This was particularly so because the demands
of an export-oriented strategy were quite severe on the maintenance of product
quality.
A profit-sharing model of wage determination could explain the observed
increase in the real wage-at a rate a little below productivity growth before
1974 and again after the adjustment of 1980-81. But another significant ele-
ment in the wage history in the Korean manufacturing sector is the sharp fall in
the share of wages in each of the two periods following the external shocks. The
successful wage repression of 1975 and 1980-81, which contributed strongly to
the stabilization effort, was the hallmark of state paternalism in wage setting.
The institution of wage setting, with its corporatist bias, permitted such short-
run declines in the share of wages when they were required in the interests of
macroeconomic adjustment.
The question still might be asked: why did wages increase significantly faster
than productivity during the "big push" in the second half of the 1970s? Proba-
bly one of the factors was the high optimism of the state-driven investments
toward diversification. The other was the tightness of the labor market, caused
not only by the "big push" but also the rather sudden and substantial emigration
of Korean workers to the Middle East to help in the post-oil construction boom
there. The unemployment rate fell to a historic low in 1978.
The unemployment rate touched this low again in 1986 and fell even lower in
1987 and 1988. The events of the past few years have created a new situation in
the Korean labor market. The wage explosion, which is still under way, is as
much due to the tightness of the labor market as to the less-paternalistic role of
the government in determining wages and the emergence of union activism as a
powerful force.
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These points were tested with an econometric model of wage determination.
The model was the usual augmented Phillips curve, with an element to capture
the profit-sharing aspect. It is hypothesized that in any period, workers have a
target real wage that is governed by the productivity growth of a previous
period. If the percentage increase in real wages falls short of the percentage
increase in productivity of the earlier period, then there is additional upward
pressure on money wages. The mechanism of the target wage could percolate
through the decisions of workers or employers or both. The model would thus
look like the following:
(3) W = a + bP, + cU_- + d(Qt_ -t,_i)
where W, denotes the percentage change in money wages in the current period,
P, denotes the expected rate of inflation, U___ denotes the unemployment rate x
periods before, &,-y denotes the percentage increase in productivity y periods
before, and tv)_Y denotes the percentage increase in real wages y periods before.
The values of x and y are found by the best fit of the model to the data.
The model was estimated with quarterly data from the third quarter of 1970
to the third quarter of 1988. The results are given in table 4. The expected
inflation rate is approximated by the rate of increase in the consumer price index
in the previous period. (It could also be interpreted as representing workers'
efforts to recapture lost real wages as a result of fast inflation.) In the first
equation in table 4, there is a reasonably good fit, with all the variables having
the right sign and strong significance.
The second equation increases the R2 substantially without reducing the sig-
nificance of the explanatory variables significantly. The extra term is the per-
centage change in money wages since four quarters before the present. The
inclusion of the variable increases the R2 by so much because there is a strong
seasonal pattern in the money wage series.8 9 The use of the dummy corrects for
the seasonality.
The footnotes to the table define the variables. The fitted equations support
the hypothesis strongly. Both the rate of unemployment and the target real wage
based on actual productivity increase enter the process of wage determination.
Either factor by itself will explain only a part of the percentage quarterly change
in wages. In periods when the unemployment rate is relatively high (before 1976
and again in the early 1980s, following the second oil crisis), the unemployment
variable underpredicts the increase in wages. The target wage variable is more
important in explaining the growth in real wages at a rate a little less than labor
productivity. By contrast, in the late 1970s and again more importantly in the
8. In particular, average earnings in the fourth quarter of each year are bumped up as workers are paid
their annual bonus.
9. The variable for growth in productivity minus real wages in table 4 can be broken down into rates
of growth of money wages, prices, and productivity, all lagged two periods. Running the regression with
productivity only, without the lagged wage and price indexes, the estimated equation performed less well,
with a smaller R2 and greatly reduced significance of the productivity growth variable.
Table 4. Determinants of Percentage Changes in Nominal Wages in Korean Manufacturing, 1970-88
Growth in
productivity Dependent
minus variable Durban-
Inflation Unemploy- growth in laggedfour Watson sta-
Regression Constant rate' ment rate real wagesb quarters Adjusted R2 tis tic F-statistic
1. Without lagged 0.135 0.869 -0.028 0.214 n.a. 0.519 2.24 25.8
dependent variable (5.87) (4.05) (-5.23) (4.51)
x 2. With lagged 0.070 0.478 -0.016 0.097 0.59 0.695 2.24 40.3
dependent variable (3.30) (2.62) (-3.39) (2.30) (6.25)
n.a. Not applicable.
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage change in nominal monthly earnings per regular employee in manufacturing, averaged for each quarter. Results
reported are for quarterly data regression analysis (OLS estimates). Periods covered by both regressions go from the second quarter of 1971 to the third quarter of
1988 (70 observations). Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
a. Lagged one quarter.
b. Lagged two quarters.
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recent years beginning in 1986, the growth in real wages at rates significantly
above productivity growth is explained more satisfactorily by unemployment
rates falling below a threshold level and signaling tight labor market conditions.
In the crisis years of 1975 and 1980-81 the equation seriously overpredicts
the increase in wages. Thus the drastic reduction in the wage-productivity ratio
in these years has to be ascribed to the state paternalistic elements in wage
determination.
The end of the period of study ushered in a remarkable change in Korean
labor markets. Unemployment rates dropped to hitherto unknown levels of 2.5
percent or lower. Emergence of the scarcity of labor coincided with political
liberalization in August 1987, and, for the first time, labor disputes were recog-
nized as legal. Wages began to explode in 1988, exceeding 20 percent a year in
1988-91. The percentage wage increase was double-digit in real terms except in
1991 and exceeded productivity growth by more than 5 percentage points in
each of the four years. Part of the explanation for the large wage increase was
the tight labor market. But the period also saw an unprecedented outburst of
labor unrest and a spectacular increase in labor disputes. It is difficult to believe
that labor militancy unleashed by the democratization of the political process
did not play a substantial role in the wage explosion.10 This development natu-
rally created new problems for the international competitiveness of Korea's
manufacturing. Fuller analysis of the new situation must await more detailed
research.
For now it is sufficient o note that the turmoil in the labor market came after
a period of real wage growth of around 6 percent a year, extending over a
quarter of a century-a phenomenon without precedent. The obvious conclu-
sion is that keeping real wages rising is not enough in and of itself to prevent
disruptions in the labor market."1 There are two possible explanations for the
labor market experience. First, wages were repressed throughout the period of
Korean growth. The real wage growth was possible because of extraordinarily
high TFP growth. The evidence presented above showed a more or less trend
decline in the wage-productivity ratio for the 25-year period, with drastic falls in
the years of adjustment. The workers were evidently aware of the decline in their
share of wages in spite of the real wage increase. Second, the political system,
which discouraged collective bargaining and effective workers' organizations,
had produced pent-up resentment that burst once the lid was taken off.
Wage-setting institutions and wage determination in Malaysia. What deter-
mines changes in real wages in the Malaysian economy? The point made above,
that real wage behavior seemed to have little relation to the phases of the cycle,
suggests that wages did not respond significantly or quickly to market forces.
10. When quarterly wage data are available for the more recent period, it would be interesting to see if
the model estimated here still applied to the period after the third quarter of 1988, perhaps with changed
values of the coefficients.
11. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for driving home this point.
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Figure 2 reinforces this point. Between 1969 and 1973, real wages in manufac-
turing declined, while employment, both in manufacturing and the recorded
(formal) sector as a whole, increased at a significant rate every year. Between
1973 and 1981, the relation between employment and real wage growth was
"normal"-both were increasing. During these years the rate of unemployment
was also falling. But from 1981 to 1985, the rate of unemployment increased
every year and the rate of growth of total employment fell-and indeed was
stagnant in the manufacturing sector-yet real wages continued to increase al-
most as fast as in the 1970s.
The puzzle becomes deeper considering the divergence in the trend in wages in
manufacturing and construction from the trend in earnings in the plantation
sector after 1980. Figure 3 shows that during the boom of the late 1970s, wages
in both rubber and palm oil estates rose along with manufacturing wages.
(Earnings are only those of wage earners employed in large estates, not those of
smallholders.) The absolute gap in earnings in favor of manufacturing was
reduced for palm oil and remained the same for rubber so that the relative gap
was squeezed because manufacturing wages were higher. But after 1980, while
wages in the plantation sector were stagnant, manufacturing and construction
wages bounded ahead until 1985. There was indeed a construction boom in
1980-81 associated with heavy public expenditure, and this might explain the
Figure 3. Real Annual Earnings by Industry in Malaysia, 1968-86
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Source: Richardson and Ying (1990: table 2).
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wage increase in this sector in these years. But the wage growth persisted in
manufacturing through 1985, even as construction wages leveled off after 1982.
What explains this odd behavior of wages in manufacturing in Malaysia? Part
of the explanation could indeed be economic. The wage series available is of
average annual earnings. During a downswing, retrenchment of workers affects
those at the bottom of the wage ladder proportionately more, and this in itself
tends to push up average earnings. This is the normal behavior of firms attach-
ing value to the experience of senior workers. In Malaysia such expected behav-
ior was reinforced by some institutional factors. For example, firms are legally
required to pay minimum benefits to workers who are terminated or laid off
after serving at least 12 consecutive months, the benefits increasing with the
years of service. Lucas and Verry (1989) looked at the characteristics of a sample
of workers who were retrenched at some point between 1984 and 1988. Their
results confirmed that "it is the young and the oldest, the less well-educated
employees from the private sector and (to a weaker extent statistically) those
outside of unionized plants, who are most likely to have been retrenched....
However, it was certainly not the only factor, for we know that pay of given
individuals continued to rise also" (table D.2 and p. 12).
Institutional factors might have been important. Unionism is not a very pow-
erful factor in the Malaysian labor market. By 1985 less than a quarter of the
workers in manufacturing had been unionized, and in some subsectors, such as
electronics, unionism was forbidden. Paradoxically, plantations, the sector in
which real wages had stagnated in the 1980s, had the highest proportion of
workers as union members. It is also generally agreed that collective bargaining
has been traditionally pursued most vigorously in plantations.
The public sector has played a dominant role in the Malaysian labor market.
Could it be that this sector, in which wages are set administratively, played a
wage leadership role in the 1980s? Lucas and Verry compared the wage series in
the government sector and in manufacturing over a long period (1989: figure
3.20, p. 56). They found that average compensation in government was around
25 percent higher than in manufacturing in the early 1970s, a gap that could
probably be explained by the difference in educational compositions of the labor
force in the two sectors (Mazumdar 1981: figure 8-1, p. 135). But the differen-
tial became very large after the pay reform in 1975.12 By 1978 the gap had
increased to more than 100 percent. After 1978 average wages in the public
sector increased less rapidly than those for manufacturing. The differential nar-
rowed persistently through 1985 in spite of another small increase in public
sector wages during 1980-81. By 1985 the public sector advantage in average
remuneration was no more than 15 percent. Thus, Lucas and Verry (1989)
conclude, "It would seem difficult to make a case that public service pay has led
12. In 1975 the findings of the Harun Commission with respect to the pay of all employees in statutory
bodies and local authorities was implemented, backdated to 1970. In 1976 the Cabinet Committee
Report was implemented, involving the pay of all civil servants.
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private pay over the entire period" It is, of course, possible that private sector
wages tried to catch up with the public sector over a long period extending over
many years. But the institutional causes of the long lag require explanation.
The institutional factors might also have made the private manufacturing
wages inflexible in the face of a slowdown of employment growth and rising
unemployment.
The contractual forms of wage agreement-both formal and informal-might
explain the rising wages of the 1 980s. Two different practices in Malaysian wage
setting seem to be particularly relevant here.
First, many collective bargaining agreements in Malaysia provide for multi-
year coverage. By law, these agreements must cover at least two years. But
agreements of three or even four years are common. Even when the plant is not
unionized, employers in the formal sector are keen to follow the going practice
of wage setting. Clearly, with contracts fixed for a long period, it is not possible
for employers to cut the wages of those employees who are not retrenched. In
this connection, agreements in the plantation sector included provisions for
tying wages to the prices of the plantation's products through a complicated
formula to ensure that to some extent wages fluctuated with product prices
when there were severe shocks. The stagnation of real wages in the 1980s in the
plantations, after a period of rapid increase, may partly reflect this effect of the
agreement working itself out after the decline in commodity prices. But in the
manufacturing and construction sectors, where the practice of tying wages to
market conditions for the product does not exist, long contracts mean that there
is a substantial lag before wages start to ad'just.3 In fact, when the rate of infl-
ation is falling, as it was in Malaysia in the 1980s, the length of time that elapses
before real, rather than money, wages begin to fall may be considerable. 1 4
The second wage-setting practice that is pertinent to the problem of wage
flexibility in the Malaysian labor market is that of automatic seniority incre-
ments. Malaysian employers, at least in the formal sector, seem to follow the
Japanese system of granting pay increases based on years of service in the firm. A
detailed report for the International Labour Organisation found the practice to
be widespread and also noticed that the incremental scales were typically wide
(McCarthy 1988). It was not unusual for a collective bargaining agreement to
provide for an occupation-specific wage scale that would grant the worker an
annual increment of 7 percent for 10 years until the maximum in the grade was
reached. The worker would receive these increments irrespective of current
economic conditions. This would be in addition to any change in basic pay or
bonuses resulting from cost-of-living adjustments or renegotiated contracts.
13. This type of delayed adjustment of wages to economic shocks is not uncommon in much of Asia
(Edgren 1989).
14. Other factors contributing to the difficulty of cutting wages in the downswing include the govern-
ment concern for employees of Malayan origin under the New Economic Policy. It might have been
difficult for employers of foreign origin to cut wages-or deny the workers seniority increments-in firms
employing a large Malay labor force.
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Lucas and Verry (1989), in the course of their interviews with firms, found
that large nonunionized firms (including multinationals) followed similar wage
practices. The system of automatic seniority increments is expected to increase
productivity by securing the loyalty and attachment of the workers to the indi-
vidual enterprise. But it does not enable wages to adjust rapidly to business
conditions, particularly when external shocks tend to be as large as they were for
Malaysia. The Japanese wage system provides a safeguard against the seniority
system by using bonuses, geared to the profitability of the firm, as a large
component of the worker's earnings. Nonbasic wages are not insignificant in
Malaysia. Such payments, including fringe benefits, constituted 15 percent of
total earnings for male workers in 1984. This percentage was relatively low
compared with Korea's. There, the share of bonuses and overtime payments in
total compensation in 1982 was as high as 30 percent, split evenly between the
two (World Bank 1989).1s
It has been pointed out that, although wages of "senior" workers are relatively
rigid, reduction in entry-level salaries is a major element in the downward
flexibility of wages (World Bank 1989). But this particular mechanism can work
strongly only when there is an opportunity to hire a significant number of new
workers. This indeed is what seems to have happened in 1986 and 1987, when
the economy started to recover. The wage for new entrants had started to fall in
1985 at the bottom of the depression, but average payments to all employees
continued to rise through 1986 (by 7.2 percent that year), reflecting built-in
escalators in old contracts. In 1987, however, average earnings finally fell,
coinciding with the upturn (World Bank 1989: 26).
Marketsfor Foreign Exchange
In both Korea and Malaysia, movements in the nominal exchange rate were
very important in determining the timing and magnitude of changes in the unit
cost of labor. The contrasting experiences of the two countries have been noted.
But the difference in the systems of exchange rate determination in causing the
different outcomes merits reemphasis. Korea, with a managed exchange rate
system and strict control over international capital flows, was able to determine
the exchange rate needed to sustain or improve international competitiveness.'6
In particular, immediately after the two oil shocks, massive devaluations of the
won reduced the unit cost of labor drastically. By contrast, Malaysia, with an
accommodating exchange rate system and no control over the capital account of
the balance of payments, seems to have been at the mercy of foreign capital
flows, even though these flows were caused by the actions of Malaysia's own
15. Overtime payments, like bonuses, input a certain flexibility to total wages even with a tenured
labor force whose basic wages increase with years of service.
16. A telltale sign of strict control over international capital flows is the existence of a black market
premium for foreign exchange. Korea had a significant premium of this type until the very recent financial
liberalization.
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private and public economic agents.17 The result seems to have been rather
perverse movements of the nominal exchange rate from the point of view of
required changes in the unit cost of labor over the cycles. The exchange rate
appreciated significantly when the export markets were declining, not when
Malaysia enjoyed a terms-of-trade bonanza.
The inverse fluctuation of the exchange rate (both real and nominal) with
respect to the terms of trade has been implicit in the discussions above. In
Malaysia, the "spending effect" caused by movements in the terms of trade has
been dampened by the behavior of private savings, which has moved directly
with the terms of trade, and also has been overshadowed by the much stronger
countercyclical behavior of public expenditure. The sign and magnitude of the
capital inflow generated by the resultant excess of spending over income
(whether positive or negative) has been a more dominant effect on the exchange
rate than the terms of trade has been, both in the upswing and the downswing of
the cycle.
In the upswing of the 1970s both government and private expenditure in-
creased, keeping pace with increases in GDP. The increase in private savings
helped to balance the deficit in the government budget so that the current
account of the balance of payments was in surplus during this period. This
surplus would have put an upward pressure on the exchange rate if government
or private savers or both were not willing to hold foreign assets. As it happened,
the government and private savers were willing to hold foreign assets. The net
international resources of the Bank Negara (valued in U.S. dollars) increased at
a substantial rate, so that the total in 1980 was up by more than a third of its
value in 1975.
As the terms of trade declined in the 1980s, the government attempt to sustain
a large countercyclical expenditure through massive foreign borrowing led to a
large inflow of capital. It was this inflow that led to an appreciation of the
ringgit even though the terms of trade were declining.'8 The capital inflow
became more important in the early 1980s because of the decentralized nature of
17. This does not mean to suggest that there is no government supervision at all over, for example,
direct foreign investment. In fact, there has been a persistent attempt to influence investors in the
direction of desired industries, for example, industries managed by Bhumiputras. But the regime is liberal
compared with the regimes of many countries of the region. The following passage from the Annual
Report of Malaysia Bank Negara (1981: 125) gives the intentions of the bank:
The liberal and non-discriminating system of exchange control was relaxed further as from October
1981, when the commercial and merchant banks in Malaysia were allowed to lend, or syndicate
loans, in foreign currency to residents of Malaysia. . . . At the same time these banks were also
permitted to borrow or accept deposits from non-residents in foreign currency. . . . Only foreign
borrowing of USS 100,000 or more requires specific permission, and permission is freely given for all
loans raised in reasonable terms and used for productive purposes in Malaysia.
18. This interpretation differs from that given in Gan and Krause (1989), which tells a standard
"Dutch disease" story. The government expenditure boom of the 1980s is best viewed as a deliberate
countercyclical policy, rather than a lagged response to the terms-of-trade increase.
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decisionmaking with respect to foreign borrowing. A World Bank study
reported:
A substantial proportion of the foreign borrowing (57 percent in 1983-84)
was undertaken by public enterprises. This recourse to external funds helped
these agencies escape the surveillance and discipline that could have been
imposed by the federal government had there been a greater reliance on the
Treasury as a source of funds. Overall net foreign inflows more than compen-
sated for the current account deficits being registered. Central Bank foreign
exchange reserves built up steadily, and pressure to depreciate the exchange
rate was temporarily diverted. (World Bank 1989: 15)
There were real counterparts to the external financial flows in the two pe-
riods. In the late 1970s the inflow as a result of the current account surplus led
to an increase in aggregate savings. In the 1980s the inflow of capital as a result
of foreign borrowing was used to increase public sector spending, much of it
bolstering demand in the domestic nontradable sector, leading to an increase in
the DRER on top of the nominal exchange rate appreciation.
The last point underlines another difference between the Korean and Malay-
sian experiences, a difference pertaining to the efficiency with which foreign
borrowing was used. It has already been mentioned that although Korea in-
creased its foreign debt ratio significantly following the oil shocks, the produc-
tivity of the investment it made possible was high, as evidenced by the high TFP
growth. However, a substantial part of the foreign borrowing in Malaysia in the
1980s was used to finance public sector projects of doubtful profitability. Evi-
dence suggests that the TFP declined in this period (see, for example, World Bank
1989: 53-54).
V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This article has discussed how two open economies with different factor
market institutions responded differently to external shocks and the need to
maintain international competitiveness. The variable used in the analysis is the
unit cost of labor in dollars. A country's international competitiveness depends
on sustaining a satisfactory unit cost of labor in relation to that of its competi-
tors in the world market. This is particularly true of the newly industrializing
countries in the world market for manufactured goods. A simple decomposition
of the determinants of the unit cost of labor showed that the three related
elements constitute this critical ratio: the wage-productivity gap, the nominal
exchange rate, and the domestic real exchange rate (DRER). But policies regard-
ing the behavior of the labor market would specifically affect the first element,
policies regarding the exchange rate would affect the second, and both sets of
policies would affect the third. In addition, fiscal and monetary policies used to
influence the economy's internal and external balance would have an impact on
all three factors.
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The analysis of the development of the two economies following the interna-
tional shocks has demonstrated the usefulness of concentrating on the unit cost
of labor and its determinants as the focus of the analysis. For most developing
economies, except the very closed ones, the unit cost of labor in manufacturing
seems to be a crucial variable, whose behavior determines the degree of success
attained in adjustment to external shocks as well as in longer-run growth. Com-
parison of the determinants of the unit cost of labor for two or three economies
in other regions might be a useful way to cut through a maze of diverging trends
and experiences.
The two Asian countries considered here did not suffer from fiscal indiscipline
or monetary mismanagement to the extent that countries in other regions have.
Hence this article has concentrated on the behavior of the labor and foreign
exchange markets and the policies and institutions affecting them. Fiscal and
monetary factors have entered the discussion only insofar as they have had an
impact on the markets for labor and foreign exchange. In studies of the adjust-
ment of Latin American economies, for example, imbalances caused by fiscal
and monetary factors would need much more attention. But this article is not
meant to provide generalizations across countries of different regions or even the
same region. Instead, the analysis of two countries in the same region, both of
which managed successful adjustments to external shocks and also sustained
long-run growth, should convince readers of the importance of looking carefully
at differences in policies and institutions between countries. The focus on the
unit cost of labor provides the necessary framework for studying these
differences.
The role of Korea's managed system, both for wage setting and for exchange
rate determination, has been shown to have been critically important to adjust-
ment. The crucial role of successfully managing the direction of change in the
determinants of the unit cost of labor at critical periods of the cycles has been
highlighted.
The contrasting case of Malaysia is interesting because, in spite of the low
degree of institutional wage setting in much of the formal sector, rules of behav-
ior seem to have emerged that produced inflexibilities in wages. Perhaps this
illustrates the way a "free" labor system evolves in the formal sector. Institu-
tional intervention may, in fact, be necessary to make the wage system respond
to economic fluctuations in the desirable way. The value of institutional inter-
vention can be seen in Malaysia's plantation industries, which have been
strongly unionized for a long time: wage contracts negotiated in that sector have
allowed wages to be tied to the (volatile) price of the output (rubber) in a
conscious attempt to make wage costs vary with fluctuations in the international
market for rubber. But, as we have seen, this adjustment mechanism was absent
in the other segments of the formal sector in Malaysia, notably in the growing
manufacturing sector. Thus, average earnings apparently increased in those sec-
tors in periods of recession and increasing unemployment in the first half of the
1980s. The flexible exchange rate system, with freedom of capital flows, accen-
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tuated the "perverse" movement of the unit cost of labor. A sharp recession was
needed to bring about the downward flexibility in the factor markets; the reces-
sion was indeed sufficiently strong to trigger Malaysia's recovery in 1987 and
after.
In recent discussions policymakers have proposed that the wage system in Ma-
laysian manufacturing embody more elements of the profit-sharing model so that
wage costs would vary directly with business conditions (Nabi 1991). Further re-
search on this development would be a useful link to the analysis provided here.
In Korea the central question for the future evolution of labor markets is the
extent to which the management of the unit cost of labor depends on maintain-
ing a paternalistic system of control. The initial impact of the relaxation of
controls over industrial relations, a relaxation that accompanied political liber-
alization after 1987, has not been very encouraging. An unprecedented increase
in labor disputes and explosive wage increases seems to have dominated the last
two years of the 1980s (Park and Park undated). At the same time, the very
elements that had been instrumental in providing flexible wage costs under the
managed system are being blamed for creating new rigidities in the payments
system. An example is the critique of the bonus system, which seems to have
been enshrined as a worker's right, no longer possessing the flexibility it had in
the past (Nabi 1991: 11-14). The new industrial relations seem to tend toward
a new, viable system. The implications of this system for labor market flexibility
is an important topic for further research.
APPENDIX. SOURCES OF DATA USED IN THE TEXT
Korea
Data on earnings in the manufacturing sector were extracted from the Statis-
tics Yearbook, published by the Economic Planning Board in Korea. These
statistics are collected by the Ministry of Labor through the monthly wage
survey. The survey covers all manufacturing establishments with 10 or more
employees. The earnings reported are the average monthly earnings of all (men
and women) regular employees. (Regular workers are those whose employment
contract is for one month or more and who worked for more than 45 days
during the three months before the reporting day.) Monthly earnings include
overtime pay, bonus pay, and base pay.
Statistics on value added, employment, and price deflators are also based on
data collected by regular surveys and reported in the Bank of Korea's Economic
Statistics Yearbook (various years).
The following secondary sources were also used for constructing the time
series: Bank of Korea, Principal Economic Indicators (various years) for the
consumer price index and the nominal exchange rate; International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics (various issues); and United Nations,
Industrial Statistics Yearbook (various issues).
Table A-1 presents major economic indicators used in the analysis for Korea.
Table A-1. Major Economic Indicators for the Republic of Korea, 1967-88
Growth of Budget Unemploy-
GNPgrowth Current account exports deficit ment rate
Year (percent) (percentageof GNP) (percent) (percentageof GNP) (percent)
1967 6.60 -4.12 28.00 - 6.2
1968 11.30 -7.49 42.20 - 5.1
1969 13.80 -7.76 36.90 - 4.8
1970 7.60 -7.35 34.00 1.60 4.5
1971 8.60 -9.38 27.90 2.30 4.5
1972 5.10 -3.56 52.10 4.60 4.5
1973 13.20 -2.28 98.60 1.60 4.0
1974 8.10 -13.05 38.30 4.00 4.1
1975 6.40 -9.05 13.90 4.60 4.1
1976 13.10 -1.09 51.80 2.90 3.9
1977 9.80 0.03 30.20 2.60 3.8
1978 9.80 -2.17 26.50 2.50 3.2
1979 7.20 -6.43 18.40 1.40 3.8
1980 -3.70 -9.56 16.30 3.20 5.2
1981 5.90 -7.21 21.40 4.70 4.5
1982 7.20 -3.91 2.80 4.40 4.3
1983 12.60 -2.07 11.90 1.60 4.1
1984 9.30 -1.62 19.60 1.40 3.8
1985 7.00 -1.01 3.50 1.00 4.0
1986 12.90 4.39 14.60 1.80 3.8
1987 12.80 7.39 36.20 - 3.1
1988 12.20 7.84 28.40 - 2.5
-Not available.
Source: Bank of Korea (various years-b) for GNP and growth of exports (1988 GNP growth rate is preliminary); Bank of Korea (various years-a).
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Table A-2. Major Economic Indicatorsfor Malaysia, 1971-86
Current Budget
account Growth of deficit Unemploy-
GDPgrowth (percentage exports (percentage ment rate
Year (percent) of GDP) (percent) of GDP) (percent)
1971 10.0 -2.5 - -8.1 -
1972 9.4 -4.9 2.0 -9.6 -
1973 11.7 1.3 14.2 -5.6 -
1974 8.3 -5.0 15.9 -6.0 -
1975 0.8 -4.7 -3.0 -8.4 -
1976 11.6 5.8 17.0 -7.1 6.1
1977 7.8 3.3 4.5 -8.6 6.1
1978 6.7 0.7 7.2 7.7 5.9
1979 9.5 4.4 18.0 -7.9 5.6
1980 7.4 -1.1 3.2 -13.6 5.7
1981 6.9 -9.6 -0.8 -19.1 5.1
1982 5.9 -13.4 10.7 -17.9 5.1
1983 6.3 -11.5 12.3 -13.2 6.0
1984 7.8 -4.9 13.8 -8.9 6.3
1985 -1.0 -2.1 0.4 -7.4 6.9
1986 1.2 -1.1 17.6 -10.5 8.3
- Not available.
Source: Malaysia, Ministry of Finance (various years).
Malaysia
The basic data for the manufacturing sector are collected by the Department
of Statistics through its surveys of the manufacturing, mining, construction, and
stone-quarrying industries. There have been five censuses-in 1959, 1963,
1968, 1973, and 1981-and in the years when there was no census, surveys
were conducted annually, except in 1980. In survey years, the coverage was
based on selected five-digit industries. Small establishments with less than five,
and in some cases less than 10, full-time employees were generally not covered.
Table A-2 presents major economic indicators used in the analysis for
Malaysia.
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